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AVOIDING THE ISSUE: LIMELIGHT
NETWORKS, INC. V. AKAMAI TECHS.,
INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
What happens when a patent is infringed by the collective ac-
tions of more than one party? Intuitively, one would think that the
patentee should be entitled to some sort of remedy; after all,
whether the infringement is the result of one person or the collec-
tive efforts of twenty, the net result is the same. More specifically,
what happens when a method patent is infringed by a party that
performs all of the steps itself except for one, instructing its users
on how to complete the process?!
Recently, the Supreme Court was faced with just such a situa-
tion in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc.2 Because
of the lower court's amazing display of judicial jujutsu 3 (i.e. avoid-
ing the actual issue of direct liability), the Court was forced to ex-
amine only the issue of whether such a situation could lead to in-
ducement liability.4 The Court answered in the negative, but
remanded it to the Federal Circuit so that it may have another
chance to address the real issue.5
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012) ("The term 'process' means process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material") (emphasis added); see also Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) ("A process is a mode of treatment of certain
materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed up-
on the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or
thing.").
2. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111
(2014) (This opinion is not yet published in the United States Reports).
3. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Much of the briefing in these cases has been directed to the
question of whether direct infringement can be found when no single entity per-
forms all of the claimed steps of the patent. It is not necessary to resolve that
issue today ... ").
4. Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2114.
5. Id. at 2120.
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The Supreme Court's ruling here, while wrong6 from a policy
standpoint and poorly argued, is a predictable outcome built on a
series of problematic opinions from the Federal Circuit. Those
cases gave us rules limiting liability for divided infringement and
then gave us, in an attempt to avoid the foreseeable consequences
of said rules, the idea that direct infringement may exist inde-
pendently of liability for direct infringement. 7 Fortunately, the
Federal Circuit now has an opportunity to right that series of
wrongs and create legally sound precedent for divided infringe-
ment, which protects the rights of method patent holders.
The following section will address the law as it applies to divid-
ed infringement, from the liability sections of the Patent Act
through the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in this case. Part III
summarizes the particular case being discussed here: the Supreme
Court decision in the Limelight dispute. Part IV explains the prob-
lems with the law leading up to this case, how the Limelight deci-
sion exacerbated the problem, the implications for patent holders,
and what can be done in the future, followed by concluding re-
marks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Infringement
The dispute in this case stems from the interpretation of the di-
rect infringement and inducement provisions of the 1952 Patent
Act.8 These provisions read:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, who-
ever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patent-
6. This paper assumes that the law should protect patentees by not allowing
would-be infringers of a method patent to evade liability by simply delegating
one of the steps to a third party.
7. Akamai at 1308-09.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(b) (2012).
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ed invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a pa-
tent shall be liable as an infringer.9
To hold a party liable for direct infringement, that party must
have used each and every element of the claim. 10 More specifical-
ly, infringement of a method claim requires that the defendant
have performed every step of that method. " On the other hand, li-
ability for inducement requires that the defendant's actions lead to
an instance of direct infringement. 2
Finally, so-called "divided infringement" occurs when the "in-
fringement" is divided between multiple parties.13 Such situations
typically only occur with method patents since, generally, an appa-
ratus claim is infringed simply by the party who completes the as-
sembly.' 4 Critically, as will be explained below, divided infringe-
ment usually does not give rise to liability.
B. BMC, Muniauction, and the Single Entity Rule
The Federal Circuit had never really addressed the issue of di-
vided infringement until 2007 in BMC Res. Inc. v. Paymentech,
9. Id. §§ 271(a)-(b).
10. Warner-Jenkinson Corp. v. Hilton Davis Corp., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)
("Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the
scope of the patented invention .... ").
11. See Joy Techs. V. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing
Standard Havens Products, Inc. v. Gencor Industries, Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374
(Fed.Cir.1991)). ("...the method claims of the patent at issue were held not di-
rectly infringed by the mere sale of an apparatus capable of performing the
claimed process. The sale of the apparatus in Standard Havens was not a direct
infringement because a method or process claim is directly infringed only when
the process is performed").
12. See Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1274
(Fed. Cir. 2004)
13. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1305.
14. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1972);
superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(f) (2012) (creating infringement liability
where a party exports unassembled components of a patented invention), as rec-
ognized by Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1305.
2014]
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L.P., where it gave us the Single Entity Rule. 15 The next year, the
Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomp-
son Corp., further refining said rule.16
1. Pre-BMC
In the BMC opinion, the Federal Circuit spoke of "the traditional
standard requiring a single party to perform all steps of a claimed
method."' 7 Though, while the court did cite some cases which
were skeptical of divided infringement, it had yet to endorse this
standard itself. 8
In fact, the Federal Circuit's 2006 opinion in On Demand Mach.
Corp. v. Ingram Indus. seemed instead to support a theory of di-
vided infringement. 19 In On Demand, the court reviewed a jury in-
struction which stated that infringement liability could arise from
the combined actions of more than one party. 20 The Federal Cir-
15. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). ("A party cannot avoid infringement, however, simply by contract-
ing out steps of a patented process to another entity. In those cases, the party in
control would be liable for direct infringement.").
16. Muniaction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2008).("In this case, Thomson neither performed every step of the claimed
methods nor had another party perform steps on its behalf, and Muniauction has
identified no legal theory under which Thomson might be vicariously liable for
the actions of the bidders. Therefore, Thomson does not infringe the asserted
claims as a matter of law.").
17. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380 (citing, Faroudja Labs v. Dwin Elecs., Inc., 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol
Corp., 501 F.2d 282, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1974)).
18. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380 (citing BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4961 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2006); Faroudja Labs v. Dwin-
Elecs., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22987 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1999); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., 501 F.2d 282, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1974)).
19. On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Indus., 442 F.3d 1331, 1344-45
(Fed. Cir. 2006) ("When infringement results from the participation and com-
bined action(s) of more than one person or entity, they are all joint infringers
and jointly liable for patent.").
20. Id. at 1344-45 ("It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringe-
ment to be performed by one person or entity. When infringement results from
the participation and combined action(s) of more than one person or entity, they
are all joint infringers and jointly liable for patent infringement. Infringement of
4
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss1/6
LIMELIGHT
cuit, in no uncertain terms, but contrary to its subsequent decisions
in BMC and Muniauction, accepted said jury instruction as sound
law.2'
2. BMC Res. Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.
The dispute in BMC involved a patented "method for processing
debit transactions" using a telephone.22 This method involved the
participation of multiple participants, such as the payee's agent,
the payment network, and the bank. 23 BMC sued Paymentech
when it learned that Paymentech was marketing similar services.24
In denying the infringement allegations, Paymentech asserted that
it did not perform all of the steps of the patented method, the re-
maining steps being performed independently by customers or fi-
nancial institutions.25
Naturally, BMC countered by pointing to the court's language in
On Demand.26 The trial court rejected this argument, determining
that the relevant language from On Demand was mere dicta.27 In-
stead, the trial court found that there could be no infringement un-
less Paymentech "directed or controlled"28 the third party perform-
ing the remaining steps of the claimed method. 29
In affirming the District Court's decision, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged its language from On Demand but still, like the Dis-
a patented process or method cannot be avoided by having another perform one
step of the process or method .... )
21. Id. at 1345 ("We discern no flaw in this instruction as a statement of
law.").
22. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1375.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1375-76.
25. Id. at 1377.
26. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1378.
27. Id. ("The district court determined that the language BMC had relied up-
on in On Demand was dicta that had not altered the traditional standards govern-
ing infringement by multiple parties, and thus affirmed the findings of the mag-
istrate judge.").
28. It is unclear what exactly constitutes direction or control, but the court
makes clear that it must be more than an "arms-length agreement." BMC at
1381.
29. Id. at 1378.
2014]
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trict Court, chose to dismiss it as mere dicta. 30 The court defended
this decision by explaining that it commented on the On Demand
jury instruction "without any analysis of the issues presented relat-
ing to divided infringement." 31
Ultimately, the BMC court gave us the Single Entity Rule, stat-
ing that in order to directly infringe a method patent, a defendant
needs to have performed each of the steps either himself or vicari-
ously through a third party (i.e. through a third party which he "di-
rected or controlled"). 32 This rule effectively prevents liability in
"divided infringement" scenarios. The court did, however, recog-
nize the possibility that this would "in some circumstances allow
parties to enter into arms-length agreements to avoid infringe-
ment," but determined that such concern did not "outweigh con-
cerns over expanding the rules governing direct infringement. '" 33
Crucially, the court also noted, "inducement of infringement re-
quires a predicate finding of direct infringement." 34
3. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thompson Corp.
Muniauction involved a dispute over electronic auction sys-
tems.35 Muniauction sued Thompson for infringement, and the
District Court, after a jury trial, held in favor of Muniauction. 36 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and vacated the decision, find-
ing, as a matter of law, invalidity due to obviousness for some of
Muniauction's claims and noninfringement for the remainder. 37
In finding noninfringement, the Federal Circuit had to address
the question of whether joint infringement can lead to liability. 38
30. Id. at 1379-80.
31. Idat 1380.
32. Id. 498 F.3d at 1379 ("In the context of patent infringement, a defendant
cannot thus avoid liability for direct infringement by having someone else carry
out one or more of the claimed steps on his behalf.").
33. BMC, 498 F. 3d at 1381.
34. Id. at 1380 (citing Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1272).
35. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1323.
36. Id. at 1321 (applying the standard from On Demand).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1328 ("... the only theory of infringement presented by Muniauc-
tion is that of so-called joint infringement.").
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Specifically, "the parties [did] not dispute that no single party per-
forms every step of the asserted claims." 39 That is, at least one step
had to be performed by the user (i.e. a third party), while others
were performed by the auction system (i.e. Thompson).40 As such,
and in view of BMC, the court had to ask whether all involved par-
ties were under the "control or direction" of Thompson to the ex-
tent that it could be said to have performed all of the steps itself.41
The court answered in the negative, noting, "Muniauction has
identified no legal theory under which Thompson might be vicari-
ously liable for the actions of the bidders.."42
C. The en banc Opinion
In the instant dispute, Akamai Technologies, Inc. ("Akamai")
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT," hereinafter
collectively "Akamai") held rights in U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703
("'703 patent"), a method patent.43  Limelight Networks, Inc.
("Limelight") provided a service in which it performed every step
of said method save one, which was performed by the customer.44
Regarding the Akamai case (the court also reviewed a similar
39. Id. 532 F.3d at 1328.
40. Id. at 1328-29.
41. Muniauction at 1329; cf. BMC at 1381 ("A party cannot avoid infringe-
ment, however, simply by contracting out steps of a patented process to another
entity. [There,] the party in control would be liable for direct infringement.).
42. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330.
43. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
44. Id. at 1306; see also Section III (A):
...although the jury found that the content providers acted under Limelight's di-
rection and control, the trial court correctly held that Limelight did not direct
and control the actions of the content providers as those terms have been used in
this court's direct infringement cases. Notwithstanding that ruling, under the
principles of inducement laid out above, Limelight would be liable for inducing
infringement if the patentee could show that (1) Limelight knew of Akamai's
patent, (2) it performed all but one of the steps of the method claimed in the pa-
tent, (3) it induced the content providers to perform the final step of the claimed
method, and (4) the content providers in fact performed that final step.
Id. at 1318.
2014]
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case45 at the same time and with the same opinion), the court
asked:
.. [w]hether a defendant may be held liable for in-
duced infringement if the defendant has performed
some of the steps of a claimed method and has in-
duced other parties to commit the remaining steps
46
A six (of eleven) judge majority issued a per curiam opinion,
reversing and remanding, purportedly overruling BMC and con-
cluding that Akamai may be able to prevail on a theory of induced
infringement. 47
1. The Majority Opinion
At the outset, the court overrules the BMC decision, which held
that ". . . in order for a party to be liable for induced infringement,
some other single entity must be liable for direct infringement."48
The court is careful, however, to note that it is not addressing the
applicability of the Single Entity Rule for direct infringement, and
that inducement still requires all steps of a method to be per-
formed.49
The court subsequently recites the "well settled" principle that
that "there can be no indirect infringement without direct in-
fringement."50 Furthermore, the court explains that BMC took this
45. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531
(Fed. Cir., Apr. 12, 2011) (dealing with a patent covering a method of electronic
communication in the healthcare industry).
46. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1305.
47. Id. at 1319.
48. Id. at 1306, (quotingBMC, 498 F.3d at 1381).
49. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1306 ("To be clear, we hold that all the steps of a
claimed method must be performed in order to find induced infringement, but
that it is not necessary to prove that all the steps were committed by a single en-
tity.").
50. Id. at 1308 (citing cases) ("The reason for that rule is simple: There is no
such thing as attempted patent infringement, so if there is no infringement, there
can be no indirect liability for infringement.").
8
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rule one step further, or perhaps one step too far, requiring that the
direct infringement be the action of a single party.5' In formulating
that rule, the BMC court combined the above principle with the
proposition that "liability for direct infringement requires that a
single party commit all the acts necessary to constitute infringe-
ment."5 2 However, the court continues, even though the above
propositions were "well supported in this court's law," the conclu-
sion drawn in BMC was incorrect. 3
The court quickly resolves this apparent contradiction by ex-
plaining that the existence of direct infringement does not neces-
sarily imply liability for direct infringement. 4 In other words, the
Federal Circuit suggests here that there may be instances of direct
infringement for which no party may be held liable, but that such
direct infringement is sufficient to satisfy the "no indirect in-
fringement without direct infringement" rule. 55
The court gives several pages of reasoning to support this con-
clusion, first appealing to the reader's sense of justice and common
sense, noting that the patentee's rights are violated regardless of
whether the infringement is divided.56 Moreover,
It would be a bizarre result to hold someone liable
for inducing another to perform all of the steps of a
method claim but to hold harmless one who goes
51. Id. ("In BMC, however, this court extended that principle in an important
respect that warrants reconsideration. id. In that case, the court ruled that in
order to support a finding of induced infringement, not only must the induce-
ment give rise to direct infringement, but in addition the direct infringement
must be committed by a single actor. Id.")
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1308-09 ("Requiring proof that there has been direct infringement
as a predicate for induced infringement is not the same as requiring that a single
party would be liable as a direct infringer.") (emphasis original).
55. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1309 ("... there is no reason to immunize the in-
ducer from liability for indirect infringement simply because the parties have
structured their conduct so that no single defendant has committed all the acts
necessary to give rise to liability for direct infringement.").
56. Id. (". . . [parties who] collectively practice the steps of the patented
method . . . [have] precisely the same impact on the patentee as a party who in-
duces the same infringement by a single direct infringer .... ").
2014]
9
Lorenzen: Avoiding the Issue: Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., In
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
192 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LA W [Vol. XXV: 183
further by actually performing some of the steps
himself. The party who actually participates in per-
forming the infringing method is, if anything, more
culpable than one how does not perform any steps.57
The court also reminds us that the statutory text does not confine
"infringement" to the acts of a single entity, pointing to legislative
history that would actually indicate the contrary.58
2. Dissents
The majority opinion is accompanied by two dissents, one by
Judge Newman and the other authored by Judge Linn. Judge
Newman argues not that the court reached the wrong conclusion
regarding the liability of the parties, but that it did so incorrectly. 59
That is, instead of creating an "inducement only" workaround, the
majority should have resolved the issue by eliminating the single
entity rule entirely.60 Judges Linn, Dyk, Prost, and O'Malley, on
the other hand, would have relieved Limelight of liability by al-
lowing the Single Entity Rule to stand.6'
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1309-11 (citing, inter alia, Hearing on H.R. 3866 Before Sub-
comm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 20 (1949)).
59. Id. at 1336.
The issues that were presented for en banc review can be simply resolved on the
present law. The court should acknowledge that an all-purpose single-entity re-
quirement is flawed, and restore direct infringement to its status as occurring
when all of the claimed steps are conducted, whether by a single entity or in in-
teraction or collaboration. Remedy is then allocated as appropriate to the par-
ticular case, whether for direct or induced or contributory infringement, in ac-
cordance with statute and the experience of precedent.
The court has fractured into two flawed positions, each a departure from estab-
lished precedent, each poorly suited to the issues and technologies that dominate
today's commerce. Today's new rule of inducement-only liability serves no
public interest, no innovation need. The consequences for the technology com-
munities are uncertainty, disincentive, and new potential for abuse. Id.
60. Id.
61. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1337-38.
In my view, the plain language of the statute and the unambiguous holdings of
the Supreme Court militate for adoption en banc of the prior decisions of the
10
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III. LIMELIGHT NETWORKS, INC. V. AKAMAI TECHS., INC.
A. Factual Background
1. The Patent
The '703 patent claims, inter alia, an Internet "content delivery
system" and a method for its operation. 62 The object of the system
is to address the "significant need in the art to provide a decentral-
ized hosting solution that enables users to obtain Internet content
on a more efficient basis ... and that likewise enables the Content
Provider to maintain control over its content."63 In essence, the in-
vention allows a content provider to deliver the base HTML of his
webpage while delegating the storage and delivery of selected
"tagged" objects on the page to third party servers. 64
2. The Parties
MIT is the assignee, and Akamai the exclusive licensee, of the
'703 patent. 65 Akamai operates a content delivery network
("CDN"), as described by the patent.66 That is, Akamai offers a
service whereby it delivers selected content to users, thereby shift-
ing the burden from the content providers and improving delivery
speed.67 Limelight also operates a CDN, similar to that described
in the '703 patent. 68 Critically, however, Limelight does not do the
"tagging," but instead requires its users to do it themselves.69
court in BMC...and Muniauction....which hold that liability under § 271(b) re-
quires the existence of an act of direct infringement under § 271(a), meaning
that all steps of a claimed method be practiced, alone or vicariously, by a single
entity or joint enterprise. Id.
62. U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 (filed May 19, 1999) (issued Aug. 22, 2000).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Limelight, 134 S.Ct. at 2115.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
2014]
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B. Procedural History
In 2006, Akamai sued Limelight for, inter alia, infringement of
the '703 patent.70 After a denial of Limelight's motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law ("JMOL"), the case was tried before a jury
in 2008 and Akamai was awarded $45.5 million in damages. 71 In
2009, Limelight sought relief from the jury finding and damages,
claiming inequitable conduct, laches, equitable estoppel and un-
clean hands." Limelight also sought reconsideration of its motion
for JMOL. 73 The District Court declined to grant relief based on
Akamai's conduct. 74 Instead, the court reconsidered and granted
Limelight's motion for JMOL of noninfringement, citing a recent
decision by the Federal Circuit. 75
Akamai appealed and, in 2010, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
District Court's finding of noninfringement. 76 The Federal Circuit
subsequently reheard the case en banc in 2012, where it acknowl-
edged that Akamai could not prevail on its theory of direct in-
fringement, but stated that Akamai may be able to prevail on a
theory of induced infringement. 77 Accordingly, that court reversed
the judgment of noninfringement and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings.78
Limelight appealed the en banc ruling, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 79
70. Limelight, 134 S.Ct. at 2115-16.; see also, Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Lime-
light Networks, 494 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D. Mass. 2007).
71. Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 95
(D. Mass. 2009).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 96.
75. Id. at 123.
76. Akamai Tech., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
77. Akamai 692 F.3d 1319
78. Id. at 1319.
79. Limelight, 134 S.Ct. at 2117.
194
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C. Supreme Court Opinion
The specific question before the Court here was "whether a de-
fendant may be liable for inducing infringement of a patent ...
when no one has directly infringed the patent under §271 (a) or any
other statutory provision."0
The Court's analysis was based on the premise, shared by the
Federal Circuit's opinion, that "liability for inducement must be
predicated on direct infringement."8I However, the Court disa-
greed with the Federal Circuit's assessment that direct infringe-
ment (just not direct infringement liability) could exist even where
§271(a) had not been violated.82 Instead, the Court speculated as
to the consequences of allowing §271(b) liability for "inducing
conduct that does not constitute infringement," implying that the
Federal Circuit's reasoning would allow inducement liability even
where a patentee's rights have not been violated.83 The Court fur-
ther warned that "[t]he decision below would require the courts to
develop two parallel bodies of infringement law: one for liability
for direct infringement, and one for liability for inducement."84
Furthermore, the Court cited §271 (f)(1), which provides liability
for inducing conduct which would constitute infringement if it oc-
curred within the United States, as evidence that Congress has the
capacity to impose liability for non-infringing conduct, but has de-
clined to do so in the case of §271(b).85
Next, the Court recited the rule that liability for contributory in-
fringement cannot be based on "conduct which would be infring-
ing in altered circumstances" and elected to extend that rule to in-
80. Id. at 2115 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 2117.
82. Id. at 2117; see Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1314 (2012) ("An examination of
other subsections of section 271 confirms that the statute uses the term 'in-
fringement' in a way that is not limited to the circumstances that give rise to lia-
bility under section 271 (a).").
83. Limelight, 134 S.Ct, at 2117. ("The Federal Circuit's contrary view
would deprive § 271(b) of ascertainable standards. If a defendant can be held
liable under § 271(b) for inducing conduct that does not constitute infringement,
then how can a court assess when a patent holder's rights have been invaded.").
84. Id. at 2118.
85. Id.
2014]
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ducement1 6  The Court subsequently explained why it rejected
Akamai's proposed reading.87 First, Akamai analogizes liability in
patent law to liability in tort law.88 The Court, however, insists
that such an analogy is inappropriate here because the case is not
that the third party is not liable for direct infringement, but rather
that no direct infringement exists in the first place.89 Continuing
with the tort analogy, the Court repeated the assertion that no pa-
tent rights have been violated in rejecting the argument that this
case is like a tort where two defendants, who would each be not
liable independently, are found liable for their collective injury.90
Second, the Court rejected an analogy to criminal aiding and abet-
ting, specifically noting "the doctrine's inconsistency with the [Pa-
tent] Act's cornerstone principle that patentees have a right only to
the set of elements claimed in their patent and nothing further." 91
Akamai further pointed to pre-1952 Patent Act doctrine, which
seemed to dictate that Limelight be liable here. 92 The Court, how-
ever, noted that such a rule would violate Muniauction, and that
"the possibility that the Federal Circuit erred by too narrowly cir-
cumscribing the scope of §271(a) is no reason for this Court to err
a second time by misconstruing §271(b) to impose liability for in-
ducing infringement where no infringement has occurred." 93
The Court also acknowledged the concern that their ruling could
allow easy evasion of infringement simply by dividing the steps of
a method patent with another party who the would-be infringer
86. Id. ("But we have already rejected the notion that conduct which would
be infringing in altered circumstances can form the basis for contributory in-
fringement, and we see no reason to apply a different rule for inducement.").
87. Id.
88. Id. ("First, respondents note that tort law imposes liability on a defendant
who harms another through a third party, even if that third party would not him-
self be liable... ").
89. Limelight, 134 S.Ct, at 2118-19.
90. Id. at 2119.
91. Id.
92. Id. ("Third, respondents contend that patent law principles established
before the enactment of the Patent Act demonstrate that a defendant that per-
forms some steps of a patent with the purpose of having its customers perform
the remaining steps is liable for inducing infringement.").
93. Id.
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neither directs nor controls. 94 However, it blames this effect on the
Muniauction ruling, and declines to further complicate the issue by
attempting to fix that problem here: "[a] desire to avoid Muniauc-
tion's natural consequences does not justify fundamentally altering
the rules of inducement liability . . . [thus] creating for §271(b)
purposes some free-floating concept of 'infringement' both unteth-
ered to the statutory text and difficult for the lower courts to apply
consistently. 95
Finally, the Court declined to re-examine the Muniauction direct
infringement rule, noting that the reach of §271(a) is not within the
scope of the question presented.96 However, it specifically noted
that, on remand, the Federal Circuit may "revisit the §271 (a) ques-
tion if it so chooses. ' 97
IV. ANALYSIS
One commentator characterizes Limelight as "[a] trip to the Su-
preme Court and back to the Federal Circuit [which] was a need-
less waste of resources that could have been avoided if the Federal
Circuit had addressed. . . whether to overturn the single entity rule
for direct infringement."98 This is probably true. As we've seen,
the en banc court's majority, for whatever reason, entirely evaded
the issue (the Single Entity Rule as applied to direct infringement)
and crafted a well-intentioned opinion based on sound policy but
very questionable (though, at times, not entirely unreasonable) le-
gal arguments. This created a predicament that the Supreme Court
94. Id. at 2120. ("Finally, respondents, like the Federal Circuit, criticize our
interpretation of §271(b) as permitting a would-be infringer to evade liability by
dividing performance of a method patent's steps with another whom the defend-
ant neither directs nor controls. We acknowledge this concern.").
95. Limelight, 134 S.Ct. at 2120.
96. Id. ("We granted certiorari on the following question: "Whether the Fed-
eral Circuit erred in holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing pa-
tent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) even though no one has committed
direct infringement under §27 1(a)").
97. Id.
98. Mary LaFrance, LaFrance on Inducement Liability for Divided Patent
Infringement: Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 2014 U.S. Lexis
3817 (June 2, 2014).
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apparently felt that it needed to try to rectify, but instead only
made worse by failing to address the root of the problem.99
A. Everyone is Wrong
If we accept the premise that the Single Entity Rule is bad law,
the best that can be said of BMC's outcome is that it probably
seemed like a good idea at the time. After all, adopting the On
Demand standard could have resulted in an infringer's unknowing
customers being held jointly liable. 1°° The Federal Circuit had a
chance to create a more reasonable standard with Muniauction, but
it opted not to do so. Upon hearing Akamai en banc, the Federal
Circuit was faced with a situation where it apparently wanted to
avoid the natural outcome of the Single Entity Rule, but apparently
was not feeling up to actually overruling BMC. It seems that the
Supreme Court, however, could not be bothered to address the ar-
guments put forward in the en banc Akamai decision, leaving us
right back where we started.
1. The Single Entity Rule: The Root of the Problem
The problems of the Limelight dispute can be traced directly
back to BMC. That is, by creating the Single Entity Rule, the Fed-
eral Circuit created a massive loophole in infringement doctrine at
the expense of patent holders. 10' Judge Newman is convincing in
her dissent in the en bane Akamai opinion where she argues that
the Single Entity Rule is not supported by statute. 02 Specifically,
she notes that section 271(a) uses the word "whoever," and statute
provides that "words importing the singular include and apply to
99. Id. (speculating as to "the Justices' frustration with discovering that they
had agreed to address an issue - inducement liability - that cannot fully be re-
solved without addressing a crucial threshold issue - the meaning of direct in-
fringement.").
100. On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1344-45 ("... they are all joint infringers and
jointly liable for patent infringement.").
101. See, e.g., Akamai at 1325 (dissenting opinion) ("... the presence or ab-
sence of infringement should not depend on cleverness or luck to satisfy a mal-
leable single-entity rule.").
102. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1322
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several persons, parties, or things.'0 3 To quote Justice Alito, "[o]ne
might think that this simple truth is enough to dispose of this ap-
peal.' 0 4 In short, BMC should not have given such a bright-line
rule requiring that infringement be committed by one entity.
2. Muniauction: A (Missed) Chance for Correction
Notwithstanding the above, wholesale adoption of the On De-
mand standard would have been unacceptable as it would have
held an infringer's customers liable as well.' °5 However, the facts
of Muniauction gave the court the opportunity to protect patent
holders from divided infringement while still shielding unknowing
"divided infringers" (like customers) from liability.
As the BMC court was so careful to point out, a defendant can-
not "avoid liability for direct infringement by having someone else
carry out one or more of the claimed steps on its behalf."'' 0 6 In oth-
er words, we can hold an infringer vicariously liable for the actions
of others, as long as there was sufficient "direction or control," so
that, legally, it is as if the infringer had performed all of the steps
himself.'07 Assuming for a moment, arguendo, that we should
have the Single Entity Rule in the first place, this makes perfect
sense. The problem, though, is that "direction or control" is too
stringent a standard, apparently limited to situations such as "con-
tracting out steps of a patented process to another entity."'' 8
Future issues, namely the instant issue with Limelight, could
have been avoided had the Muniauction court simply allowed "di-
rection or control" to include the facts of that case. Such a result
would not have been at all unreasonable. Specifically, in Mu-
niauction, Muniauction owned the patent on a particular electronic
auction service.10 9 Thompson "infringed" by performing most of
103. Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1).
104. Limelight, 134 S.Ct. at 2117.
105. On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1344-45.
106. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1379.
107. Id. at 1380-81.
108. Id. at 1381.
109. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1321.
2014]
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the steps of the patent and leaving at least one step to be performed
by its customers, namely the step where the customer bids." I 0
The obvious logical result would have been for the court to rule
that instructing a third party (e.g. a customer) on how to participate
in a patented process that necessarily involves said third party sat-
isfies the "control or direction" standard. Or, if the court truly be-
lieved that such a ruling would be contrary to the BMC precedent,
rehearing the case en banc and there ruling in a way which would
not allow such "infringement."
Instead, it reaches the bizarre, and ultimately harmful, result that
a patent whereby one provides a service to a customer requiring
customer input is effectively unenforceable, due to the Single Enti-
ty Rule, since, (1) it requires the participation of multiple parties
and, (2) instructing the customer on how to participate does not
count as "control or direction.""'
3. A Half-Hearted Fix: The en banc Akamai Opinion
When the Federal Circuit agreed to rehear Akamai en banc, it
probably appeared, both to the parties involved and outside ob-
servers, as though the court were taking the opportunity to reex-
amine the Single Entity Rule. 1 2 Instead, though it claimed to
"overrule" BMC, in actuality it dodged the issue by examining the
case under a theory of inducement. I 3
This would be fine, except, as the Federal Circuit has repeated
ad nauseum, inducement must stem from direct infringement.14
Since the steps in the Akamai case were divided between two par-
ties, it would seem that the requisite direct infringement would
need to be subject to the Single Entity Rule.
110. Id. at 1328.
111. Id. at 1330 ("That Thompson controls access to its system and instructs
bidders on its use is not sufficient to incur liability for direct infringement.").
112. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1306 ("Much of the briefing in these cases has
been directed to the question whether direct infringement can be found when no
single entity performs all of the claimed steps of the patent.").
113. Id. (".... we find that these cases and cases like them can be resolved
through an application of the doctrine of induced infringement.").
114. Id. at 1308.
200
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In order to continue avoiding the Single Entity Rule issue, the
court made a distinction: 271(a) direct infringement (i.e. liability
for direct infringement) is only a subset of all direct infringe-
ment.'15
By itself, the above argument, while convoluted and not entirely
persuasive, initially seems reasonable in light of the desirable out-
come (the protection of Akamai's patent rights). It seems less rea-
sonable, however, in view of the two dissents, Newman's provid-
ing a much more straightforward way to dispose of the issue and
Linn's explaining that 271(a) does, in fact, define direct infringe-
ment. 116
4. Making it Worse: The Supreme Court Limelight Opinion
Hindsight forces us to wonder why the Federal Circuit has cho-
sen to avoid addressing the underlying issue. Now, after the Su-
preme Court's remand of the case, the Federal Circuit will need to
either re-define direct infringement liability or leave a large loop-
hole in patent protection.
From a policy standpoint, the Supreme Court's ruling here is
clearly incorrect (assuming, for policy reasons, that we want to
protect patentees from divided infringement). The problem is that,
legally, the Federal Circuit put it in a tough position. However,
not only was the Supreme Court wrong, it didn't even do a good
job of being wrong. Rather than addressing the Federal Circuit's
arguments, mainly that liability for direct infringement does not
encompass all of direct infringement, it simply repeats its mantra:
"liability for inducement must be predicated on direct infringe-
ment." 117 This is true, but it doesn't answer the real question: can
direct infringement exist independently of liability for direct in-
fringement? All the Court had to do here, to at least give the illu-
115. Id. at 1308-09 ("Requiring proof that there has been direct infringement
as a predicate for induced infringement is not the same as requiring proof that a
single party would be liable as a direct infringer.").
116. Id. at 1322 ("The word 'whoever' in § 271(a) does not support the sin-
gle-entity rule."); Id. at 1339.
117. Limelight, 134 S.Ct. at 2117.
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sion that it had actually read the decision it was overruling, was
repeat the arguments put forward by Judge Linn in his dissent.
Instead of addressing the complex issue at hand, the Court simp-
ly regurgitated the rule that "where there has been no direct in-
fringement, there can be no inducement of infringement under
§271(b)," apparently presupposing a lack of direct infringement in
this case.1 8 Admittedly, the presupposition was half correct: under
the Federal Circuit's ruling, there was no direct infringement lia-
bility under §271(a). 1" 9 However, the Court apparently takes that
to mean that there was no direct infringement at al120, where the
very essence of the Federal Circuit's argument was that direct in-
fringement could exist independently of §27 1(a) liability. ' 2' So, in
essence, the Court ignored a substantial portion the Federal Cir-
cuit's argument, which, left unrebutted, argues against the Court's
conclusion. The Court's axiomatic approach results in circular
logic which boils down to a declaration that the Muniauction rule
was not violated because the patent was not infringed, and the pa-
tent was not infringed because the Muniauction rule was not vio-
lated. 22
The Parade of Horribles which could supposedly result from the
Federal Circuit's decision, should it be allowed to stand, is equally
unimpressive. Specifically, the Court complains of "some free-
floating concept of 'infringement' both untethered to the statutory
text and difficult for the lower courts to apply consistently." 123
This comment is disingenuous at best, and severely underestimates
lower courts' abilities to look at things and come to a reasonable
conclusion on a case-by-case basis. That is, the "free floating con-
cept" is hardly abstract, difficult, or ill-defined; it simply asks
whether all the steps of a method were performed. If so, the patent
was infringed, regardless of whether anyone is liable as a direct in-
fringer. Beyond that, a lower court surely has the cognitive prow-
118. Id. at 2117, 2120 ("The question presupposes that Limelight has not
committed direct infringement under §271(a).").
119. Id. at 2120.
120. Limelight at 2117.
121. Akamaiat 1308-09.
122. Limelight, 134 S.Ct. at 2119 ("By contrast, under the Muniauction rule,
respondents' interests in the '713 [sic] patent have not been invaded.").
123. Id. at 2120.
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ess to distinguish between two entities acting entirely independent-
ly and two entities acting in concert, though not to the extent that
vicarious liability can be assigned (e.g. a service provider instruct-
ing its customers on how to use its service). This is not to say that
the Federal Circuit's opinion was entirely sound legally, just that
had the Court let it be (thus preserving its positive practical effect)
it would not have been the unworkable and overzealous expansion
of patent protection that the Court makes it out to be. That being
said, the Court could have taken this opportunity to create clear
precedent to solve this dispute and guide others like it in the future.
Instead, Justice Alito's short opinion (a mere six pages) gives the
impression that the Court simply found this case annoying and
wanted to dispose of it as quickly as possible. 12 4
B. Practical Implications
Limelight did not yield a positive outcome for patent holders.
Even the Supreme Court recognized that this ruling creates a loop-
hole for evading infringement of method patents.I25 As mentioned,
however, the Court declined to attempt to solve the problem, in-
stead placing blame squarely on the Federal Circuit: "[a]ny such
[problem], however, would result from the Federal Circuit's inter-
pretation of §271 (a) in Muniauction."'26
This problem, if not resolved, will be particularly hard on hold-
ers of method patents which involve communication between
physically separate entities. This issue is especially relevant in the
last two decades or so because of the advent of the Internet. Now,
with a patented method implemented in software, steps can be di-
vided between parties on different continents with very little diffi-
culty. Surely this was not foreseen by the writers of the 1952 Pa-
tent Act.
124. Id. ("Respondents ask us to review the merits of the Federal Circuit's
Muniauction rule for direct infringement under §271(a). We decline to do so to-
day.").
125. Id. ("Finally, respondents, like the Federal Circuit, criticize our interpre-
tation of §271(b) as permitting a would-be infringer to evade liability by divid-
ing performance of a method patent's steps with another whom the defendant
neither directs nor controls. We acknowledge this concern.").
126. Id.
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It is strange, then, that BMC, and then Muniauction, which gave
us the Single Entity Rule, are so recent. Perhaps the court, in both
of those cases, was so focused on the specific circumstances that it
failed to adequately consider the long-term implications. Specifi-
cally, in BMC, Paymentech relied on dicta from On Demand in its
argument. 27 There, the court may have viewed its options as turn-
ing either the On Demand rule or the Single Entity Rule into law.
The problem, perhaps, was that the On Demand rule would have
held customers of the "infringing" companies liable as well, which
we should be able to agree would be unacceptable.28
On the other hand, obviousness was the first issue that the court
dealt with in Muniauction.129 The Federal Circuit may very well
have seen the Single Entity Rule as an easy way to dispose of the
plaintiffs remaining claims. As we've seen, this put the Federal
Circuit in a tough position when it was faced with a plaintiff
whose rights were clearly violated, but the violation did not meet
the Single Entity Rule. 3 0
Defenders of the Single Entity Rule claim that problems can be
avoided with simple claim construction.' 3' Judge Newman ad-
dresses this argument effectively in his dissent:
I take note of the Linn cadre's argument that ingen-
ious patent claim drafting can avoid single-entity
problems, and undoubtedly it would help in some
situations. I do not discourage ingenuity, but the
presence or absence of infringement should not de-
127. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1379-80.
128. Id. at 1379 ("... they are all joint infringers and jointly liable for patent
infringement.").
129. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1324-29.
130. Akamai at 1306 (explaining that "[under BMC and Muniauction] the pa-
tentee has no remedy, even though the patentee's rights are plainly being violat-
ed by the actors' joint conduct.").
131. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1349-50 (2012) (dissenting opinion) ("As this court
correctly recognized in BMC, 'the concerns over a party avoiding infringement
by arms-length cooperation can usually be offset by proper claim draft-
ing."')(citing BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381)).
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pend on cleverness or luck to satisfy a malleable
single entity rule. 132
Furthermore, protection of patentees whose issues could be
avoided via more careful claim drafting is nothing new: the doc-
trine of equivalents is a judicial creation which protects patentees
from "infringement" by something which was not actually
claimed. 33 Even though doctrine of equivalents cases could, likely
always, be avoided by careful claim drafting, the doctrine has be-
come an important part of patent law. 34 Therefore, claiming that
plaintiffs with Single Entity Rule problems should not prevail be-
cause they could have written their claims more carefully is, for
better or worse, inconsistent with well-established precedent.
We should also note that Limelight is not like Dynacore where
there was the mere possibility of infringement if the defendant's
product was used in a particular way.", In Limelight, customers
are (presumably) paying for a content distribution service, and in
order to use that service must "tag" their website accordingly, thus
completing the patented method. 36 Put another way, there is no
non-infringing way a customer could use Limelight's service.
It is nonsensical that Limelight was able to avoid liability by
making the technologically trivial change of having their custom-
ers perform the "tagging" step. Following this ruling, we can ex-
pect to see instances of outright copying of method patents, espe-
cially those which are implemented in software, with the method
divided between multiple parties. Specifically, we can expect to
see copying by providers of online services who can simply shift
one step of a patented method to their customers since Muniauc-
132. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1325 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
133. See generally Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339
U.S. 605 (1950) (setting out the Doctrine of Equivalents).
134. See, e.g., Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17 (1997) (refining the Doctrine of Equivalents).
135. Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1274. In Dynacore, the patent at issue claimed a
particular type of computer network and defendant's products incorporated
technology which could, hypothetically but among other things, be used to im-
plement such a network; the court granted summary judgment of non-
infringement. Id.
136. Limelight, 134 S.Ct. at 2115.
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tion tells us that instructing customers does not count as "direction
or control." '
Limelight is particularly harmful to patents claiming methods of
communication. It is a perfectly reasonable assumption that many,
if not most, of such patents are written in such a way as to require
the participation of two or more parties (i.e. a sender and a receiv-
er). So, while it does not render the patents invalid, the Supreme
Court's ruling does mean that they are effectively unenforceable.
C. Cleaning Up the Mess
Thankfully, the Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case,
specifically leaving the door open for the Federal Circuit to reex-
amine its definition of direct infringement under §271(a).138 So,
what should the Federal Circuit do with this opportunity?
First, we need to establish what a desirable outcome would be in
this case. The Federal Circuit (save Judges Linn, Dyk, Prost, and
O'Malley) would probably like to ensure that Limelight is held li-
able, closing the loophole created by the Single Entity Rule. On
the other hand, we almost certainly do not want to hold unknowing
customers jointly liable in divided infringement situations. If left
alone, the en bane majority's opinion would have actually solved
the customer liability problem, since it only imposed liability on
the "inducer." 139
Clearly, however, the en bane majority's inducement theory is
no longer an option, and the court will be forced to deal with the
underlying issue of direct infringement. Adopting the dicta from
On Demand is not an option either, since it would absolutely lead
to customer liability. 140
The obvious solution is for the majority to adopt Justice New-
man's position from her dissent: abolish the Single Entity Rule, al-
137. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330.
138. Limelight, 134 S.Ct. at 2120 ("[T]he Federal Circuit will have the op-
portunity to revisit the §271 (a) question if it so chooses.").
139. Akamai at 1319 (remanding on a theory of induced infringement).
140. On Demand at 1344-45 ("... they are all joint infringers and jointly lia-
ble for patent infringement.").
206
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locating remedy "as appropriate to the particular case ... ."141 As-
suming, for a moment, that the majority will have only the option
of adopting either Justice Newman or Justice Linn's approach, Jus-
tice Newman should prevail, given that the majority seems to want
to hold Limelight liable.
Perhaps another option, which may even gain some support
from the Linn camp, would be to keep the Single Entity Rule but
to relax the "direction or control" standard, divorcing it from vicar-
ious liability. Put another way, the Single Entity Rule should pro-
tect only entities who acted completely independently of each oth-
er.
Applying that approach to the facts in Limelight would result in
liability; indeed, most (if not all) instances of customers perform-
ing the remaining steps of a patented method should result in lia-
bility. In Limelight, Limelight provided a service, an essential el-
ement of which was the "tagging" of the website. 42 Strictly
speaking, customers did not "have" to perform the patented step,
but then the customer would have been paying for a service he was
not using.143 Under any reasonable standard, that should count as
"directing" or "controlling" the customer, but under Muniauction it
does not.144 Relaxing the "direction or control" standard would al-
so avoid the problem of customer liability. Since the Single Entity
Rule would still be in place, only one party, the "controlling" par-
ty, could be the infringer.
V. CONCLUSION
Limelight is merely the latest in a series of problematic cases
dealing with divided infringement. BMC gave us the nonsensical
Single Entity Rule, and Muniauction clarified the strict standard
defining where liability for divided infringement is permissible.145
The Federal Circuit in Akamai, apparently dissatisfied with the
implications of the Single Entity Rule but unwilling to overrule it
141. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1336.
142. Limelight, S.Ct. 134 at 2115.
143. Akamai at 1306.
144. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330; BMC 498 F.3d at 1381.
145. Id.
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entirely, put a convoluted standard by which inducement liability
may be imposed in divided infringement scenarios. 146 In the case
at hand, the Supreme Court opts to replace the Federal Circuit's
flawed-but-with-a-positive-outcome reasoning with its own
flawed-but-with-a-negative-outcome reasoning. 141 The Court
doesn't disappoint, either, when it continues this case's apparent
tradition of dodging the issue by failing to address direct infringe-
ment. 14
8
Thankfully, the fact that the Supreme Court "punted" this case
means that the Federal Circuit gets to look at it again. 149 With its
original workaround out of the question, the court will have to de-
termine what it wants to do with the Single Entity Rule. Hopefully
it will take guidance from Justice Newman's dissent and eliminate
the single entity rule entirely. Furthermore, it seems particularly
unlikely that a majority of the court would agree to an enthusiastic
endorsement of the Single Entity Rule, as Justice Linn suggests, 150
since it would free Limelight of liability. Alternatively, the court
may choose to "water down" the single entity rule by relaxing the
"direction or control" standard.
Either way, this issue is not going to go away by itself. As the
law stands now, we can expect evasion of what common sense
tells us should be infringement by way of simply dividing steps be-
tween parties. This ruling may very well have turned a host of
communications-related patents (which require a sender and a re-
ceiver) essentially unenforceable, though still valid. This is an un-
acceptable result in our increasingly interconnected and software-
based world.
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